Inspired on experiences observed in certain developing countries, we propose a simple model to explain the emergence of a class of subsidized energy price cycles. It exploits the use of median household's preferences for receiving transfer gains followed by future transfer losses.
Introduction
Energy subsidies are currently important ingredients of world-wide debates. The global warming conference held in Warsaw in 2013 came preceded, as never before, by position papers from a wide spectrum of different, and normally opposing, organizations and institutions. 1 From Greenpeace [2013] to the International Monetary Fund (Clemments et al. [2013] ), they requested to limit subsidies to fossil fuels, which had previously been estimated to be 0.7% of World's GDP by the OECD [2012] . 2 Energy subsidies are seen as major obstacles to decarbornization policies and, at the same time, the empirical evidence suggests they have weak redistributive effects. In fact, they have typically favored high income households in developing nations and capital intensive firms in rich countries (see for example IMF [2013] and Izquierdo et al. [2013] ).
The advocacy behind this evidence is that energy subsidies negatively affect economic growth and employment, have unintended pro-rich transfers and retard the move towards low greenhouse gas emissions (see also ODI [2013] ). As a result, several major multilateral organizations have been proposing different lines of reform (e.g. World Bank [2010] , Clemments et al. [2013] , and Mendoza [2014] ).
In practice, energy subsidies are transitory or permanent components of actual policy in many emerging and developed countries. In some cases, the decision to subsidize energy might derive from an objective to transitorily cushion economies from external shocks (see World Bank [2010] , Bacon and Kojima [2006] , and Artana et al. [2007] ). In others, energy subsidies comprise a byproduct of unstable domestic macroeconomic environments that require income policies or some muddling through of domestic prices for a while. 3 . Beyond short-term shocks, there have been some recent efforts to understand the long run macroeconomic implications of energy subsidies in the long run, as they introduce distortions and affect economic welfare (see Plante [2014] ). While these previous analysis are all well documented and understood, there is a different class of energy price interventions in some developing countries where they are part of 1 See UNFCC [2013] . 2 There are significant methodological differences in the way country or regional case studies have measured energy subsidies and their decomposition (see Navajas, 2015) . At a global level, while OECD estimates have kept an homogenous criteria, results may depend on what is included in the definition. Thus, recent global estimates of energy subsidies (still performed on data before the recent drop in energy prices) have reassessed these figures by enlarging the usually pre-tax observed structure of prices to post tax measures that give rise to substantially higher estimates (see Coady et.al. 2005) . 3 Argentina crisis in 2002 and other previous episodes correspond to this case (see Navajas [2006] ).
a non-transitory policy that exploits energy price departures from opportunity costs in order to make transfers to consumers (i.e., voters) at the expense of previous sunk investments. Shorttermism and political opportunism to extract economic quasi-rents and to set unsustainable transfers through low energy prices are an extreme form of subsidy that pertain to the realm of macroeconomic populism 4 (and that we label "energy populism". The conventional view on this policy is usually skeptical, to say the very least. First, the economy is only transferring the bill of adjustments to the future and the consequences may not only be returning to higher (break-even, cost reflective sustainable) prices, but rather jumping to higher opportunity cost if production efficiency and policy credibility are damaged. Second, generalized transfers through (usually uniform) energy prices have a poor distributional incidence since they imply large transfers to the non-poor. This second fact has made populist policies rather puzzling. There is clear dissonance between discourse and consequences.
Our study is a particular representation this last sort of price cycles observed in some energy markets. Several case studies of energy subsidies reform have depicted these cycles and are interested in how the subsidies are dissembled. Instead, our study goes beyond empirical motivations into the analytics behind the emergence of subsidies and the subsequent welfare effects (i.e. measurement of their performance). Concretely, we assess the consequences of a movement in energy prices that fits into a populist policy cycle. 5 The basic story goes as follows: end-user energy prices fall severely in real terms following a government decision to freeze (or reduce) domestic energy prices for several years, even within an inflationary context.
When the economy cannot sustain the mounting external and fiscal macroeconomic pressures energy prices bounce back. A likely ingredient of this cycle is that ex-post-intervention long run opportunity costs of energy are higher than ex-ante-intervention opportunity costs. As a result, one legacy of energy populism is not only that policies need to be reverted at some point in the future, but also that economic agents will face a future efficiency loss due to higher ex-post 4 See Dornbush and Edwards [1991] and Edwards [2010] for well known representations of macroeconomic populism in Latin America. In Argentina, Canitrot (1975) provided a seminal classic model of the phenomena. 5 On comparative empirical evidence see, for example, Vagliasindi [2012] where several developing countries display a pattern for the evolution of electricity prices similar to the description made here. Among them, the cases of Iran and Argentina seem to be of particular relevance because of the magnitude of the cycle and the reversal and in tha case of Argentina seems to fit well into a broader populist economic policy in several dimensions. Still, electricity prices in Azerbaijan, Egypt, Ghana, Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, Pakistan and Moldova also conform to a markedly subsidy cycle followed by a reversal.
prices. And that is true at least for a number of future years until domestic market conditions return to normal. 6 The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2, we make the energy populism setting more precise and explore some requirements for this to arise as equilibrium. We see energy populism as a policy of subsidies designed to gain secure support from the median household. Then we move to our empirical exercise, which is developed in Section 3 and implemented in Section 4. We use residential consumption data for the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area and provide a measurement of the transfers and welfare consequences that fall and rise of natural gas and electricity prices caused during the last decade. Section 5 concludes the paper and comments on further issues that merit future research.
Energy populism

The context
The model of this section is solely intended to illustrate theoretically how a populist cycle might emerge within the context of residential energy prices. In the empirical section presented later in the paper, we are not able to directly test the model from the available data. However, the inclusion of a model that incorporates the majority of relevant facts observed in certain developing countries will help interpret the empirical findings presented later in this study.
Following the standard literature in political economics, we present a model that includes two sectors: households and government. In our model, the economic equilibrium and the political equilibrium are both important to characterize the situation. 7
In particular, we study a sequence of energy prices (e.g., natural gas as an illustration) that departs from long-run sustainable opportunity costs (LRSOC). The departure derives from the implementation of an unsustainable policy that we label "energy populism" and make more precise later. The basic idea of what we are addressing can be shown with the aid of Definition 1.
Definition 1. Throughout the paper, we define an "intervention policy" in domestic energy markets as a reduction in current prices below LRSOC and a later increase to cover a higher (due to intervention) future LRSOC.
Let us suppose there are two periods, t=1,2. At the starting point (i.e., prior to the beginning of t=1), the natural gas price measured in U.S. dollars (USD) per million btu is 0 P , and this is equal to the LRSOC, 0 C . In addition, 0 P is the energy component in the residential natural gas tariff. At the beginning of t=1, an intervention policy is implemented; thus, the price is set at 1 0 P P < (with 1 P presumably below short-run marginal cost), exploiting an opportunistic situation to engineer transfers to society. 8 To simplify the analysis, let us assume 0 1 C C = . However, the opportunistic policy implemented in t=1 increases LRSOC in period t=2 (for example, it affects incentives for producers to invest in new production wells). As a result, the low energy price policy can be sustained for one period at the most, and in t=2, it must be reverted to cover LRSOC, 2 2 P C = . Figure 1 illustrates the previously mentioned ideas. 8 We do not consider fiscal transfers set to sustain production at prices below short-run marginal costs. This policy has income transfers perceived by voters and welfare impacts on society that need not to be identical. In fact, we exploit these differences by first exploring voting decisions by households on perceived transfers and then move to compute welfare transfers to society depending on prices and opportunity costs. In this section, we explore a strategic decision structure related to the emergence of the subsidy policy as equilibrium. Before proceeding further, we present an explicit definition of energy populism.
Definition 2. Energy populism is a policy (consistent with a discourse or "narrative") that, while claiming to support "the people" versus "the elite", seeks the secure support of the median voter to implement unsustainable transfers through lower energy prices, heavily interfering with efficient energy price formation in a non-transitory manner. 9
A nearly canonical vision to deal analytically with problems such as that described previously has been to resort to either political opportunism or to myopic behavior (i.e., high or hyperbolic discounting). In this vein, decision makers or the society as a whole prefer (in present net value) transfer of gains in the first period and of losses in the second period rather than a sequence of equilibrium prices. While we cannot disagree with this view, we prefer to re-phrase the argument, looking at the more structural-like elements behind the implementation of energy populism as equilibrium.
A simple model of energy populism
Households 9 Despite the widely accepted view that the term populism is too vaguely and broadly used in different contexts and that it refers to different historical and geographical events, some scholars have recently argued that there exists a conceptual unity capable of encompassing a wide range of manifestations (e.g, Woods [2014] ). Some political science rationalizers of populism have emphasized the fundamental role of the "narrative" in the emergence and implementation of populist policies (see, for instance, Laclau [2005] ). We have no possibility of capturing such a (rather vague) dimension in our framework. We are aware that the point may call attention to the fact that policies (as substance) need necessarily to be consistent with discourse (as forms) that, in the populist antagonist strategy, means identifying policy winners and losers. When we say that a populist policy is one that seeks the support of a large fraction of the population, in a voting sense, we should perhaps avoid meaning any fraction in particular, but one that can be shown to necessarily favor low-income and lower-middle-class voters, as the fundamental groups in a broader coalition behind populist policies. Regardless of the existence of an equilibrium in voting terms, the coalition supporting the transfers need being close to "friends" (low-income groups) rather than to "enemies" (highincome groups)above any position regarding policy preferences.
Consider an economy that lasts for two periods (t =1,2). In an infinitely-lived-agents-economy, t=1 might cover a number of present years, while t=2 might cover the remaining future years. At t=1, each household h (h=1,2,…,H)maximizes its utility, which is additively separable in time and in two groups of commodities (energy, e, and non-energy goods, ne) 
We assume that e U and ne U are strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable functions. Those are sufficient conditions to ensure that preferences are single-peaked. 10
Additionally, we assume the direct utility function is group-wise homothetically commodityseparable, a condition that guarantees that the indirect utility function is also group-wise homothetically commodity-separable for the same group of commodities (i.e., energy and nonenergy goods). 11 Strong separability allows us to neglect the indirect impact of energy prices through the level and structure of the remainder of prices in the economy.
End-user energy tariffs can be decomposed into: commodity energy prices (P in our model), transmission and distribution margins, and taxes. We deal with commodity energy prices (henceforth simply referred to as energy prices) that may or may not be different across households. As a consequence of all the assumptions made, we are able to simplify the analysis by considering an indirect utility function that only includes energy prices and exogenous household income as its arguments
(2) 10 For example, Jorgenson (1997) .
In their voting decisions, households face two rival sequences of prices:
θ is a parameter affecting household h's expected future prices. In period t=1, the intervention policy affects household h utility positively and the change in utility becomes 12
As for non-positive transfers in t=2, we further assume that households anticipate that the price increase will be partially shifted to "outsiders" or the "elite", which are represented by the wealthiest segments of the population, large user tariffs (such as industrial customers), intramarginal producers that will face Ricardian quasi-rents under 2 h P , or the government (through taxes and/or cross subsidies). The change in utility at t=2 is
Parameter h θ might be affected by the policy chosen by the incumbent government in a way to communicate or signal voters. The incumbent will attempt to convince a large fraction of households that exit conditions from current policy are such that prices will not exceed 0 h P or even remain close to 1 h P for some households. However, many households may realize that an unfreezing will inevitably occur in the second period and that 2 h P will overshoot 0 h P . In our model, the perceived exit is given by h
for all θ whenever m n < . Hence, n F first-order stochastically dominates m F , i.e., high-income households expect a higher share of the bill to be paid later. In contrast, poorer households expect slight increases in energy bills in t=2. The voting behavior of a household h in the first period is represented by the following expression:
12 Recall that end-user prices or tariffs that enter into the indirect utility function depend upon energy commodity prices. That is why we include in our notation ( ) e h q P . 
The previous equation gives the condition for household h to prefer { }
The fraction of households voting for the populist policy is ( )
where we have assumed that all households have the same discount factor and that G is a smooth cumulative distribution function with an associated density function g.
Government
Departures from opportunity cost pricing are punished during the second period for different reasons. For instance, they affect the incentives to invest in hydrocarbon exploration or to adopt new technologies, converting the country (led by the incumbent political party) into a high-risk
investment. If during the first period 1 P is below 1 C (i.e., opportunity cost), then it is very likely that 2 C will stand significantly above 1 C . Let us consider the following expression formalizing this idea:
where ( ) κ ⋅ is a function that captures the intervention premium, i.e., the additional opportunity cost observed in t=2 due to the effect of the populist policy implemented in t=1. The shock ε follows a mean-zero and symmetric (around the mean) distribution. We assume that the intervention premium is differentiable with 0 κ′ > , 0 κ′′ > , and also that (0) 0 κ = . To facilitate the analysis, let us suppose that there is an inter-temporal budget constraint and also that general taxes (or government revenues coming from other sectors) cannot be used to subsidize energy.
For simplicity, omitting shock ε from the LRSOC transition equation, the incumbent government solves the following maximization problem:
where 0 α > is the weight that the politician places on total utilitarian social welfare (relative to the weight placed on rents from being in office). The additional utility that the politician derives from being in office is given by K. Energy prices are chosen from a set of "politically feasible" prices, P , which might be a discrete subset or a continuum of non-negative real numbers. As we supposed that there are no random shocks to opportunity costs in expression (7), we have
Note also that 0 1 2
Political equilibrium
From expression (5) presented previously, we are able to define household h' critical discount factor as
if an interior solution for δ (between 0 and 1) exists, assumption, a decreasing function of income. We can therefore order households as follows:
By combining the two restrictions in problem (8), we can transform it into an unconstrained maximization problem since the optimal price in t=2 is a function * Proof: Derived from the condition that * M δ δ > is an equilibrium.
Household welfare
The previous discussion motivated the analysis of the trade-off between present value gains and losses derived from the implementation of energy populism as an equilibrium policy. In this section, we make some effort to measure actual income transfers and their corresponding welfare effects. We follow a simple methodology to evaluate aggregate welfare from final outcomes in For the empirical implementation, we make auxiliary assumptions on the shape of the socialwelfare and individual-utility functions. A simple parameterization (see for example, Newbery [1995] , and Navajas [1999] ) 14 assumes that the social welfare function is additive in utility levels, / ( η is the direct price-elasticity of demand (for electricity or natural gas). In the empirical evaluation later, we do not exploit this loop, given that the magnitude of the jumps in prices are very large and would imply largequantity corrections even with very low elasticity values (such as those reported for natural gas and electricity in several empirical papers). 
This expression will be computed later in this study for alternative values of the income inequality aversion coefficient, v.
Empirical illustration.
With the model of the previous section in mind, we now seek to measure the consequences of a sequence of natural gas and electricity prices faced by Argentinean households during the last decade.
The Argentinean case. An overview of the situation.
Post-2003 Argentina appears to perfectly fit in the populist model described before. Within a policy of repressed energy prices in general, even with clear signs of cumulative imbalances in its main energy product (i.e., natural gas) and soaring international energy prices, wholesale markets of natural gas and electricity generation were severely intervened, entailing prices that depart from LRSOC. 17 In the case of natural gas (formerly a very competitive sector), it could perhaps have sustained production plans with wellhead prices below the import parity (whose relevant value is the import price from Bolivia) before the consolidation of the interventionist regime. However, after intervention, sustainable wellhead prices were required to move toward import prices. Although the origin and magnitudes in this example can be subject to discussion, the important fact for the sake of our argument is their qualitative evolution: ex-post-intervention opportunity costs are higher than ex-ante-intervention opportunity costs. Therefore, economic agents face a net efficiency loss.
A great deal of debate in Argentina has been focused on energy subsidies in terms of their fiscal short-run consequences. But in this paper, we look at the role of subsidies from a long-run economic viewpoint. The difference is important because fiscal transfers made by the government are actual disbursements to energy producers to account for the difference between 17 The term "sustainable" in LRSOC refers to the fact that there is an expansion of supply (natural gas and electricity generation capacity) to sustain. This applies in particular to natural gas, where reserves to production have been falling and require a prompt, dynamic response. In other words, LRSOC are regarded as signals that will ensure a sustainable energy supply. costs (or producer prices) and end-user prices. However, this gap does not represent the true resource-cost gap to the economy. Economic subsidies are the difference between end-user prices and opportunity costs represented by border prices or long-run incremental costs in the case of tradable and nontradable goods, respectively.
Measurement
We employ different data from several sources and make some assumptions in order to estimate household transfers and changes in welfare. The basic ingredients relate to prices and quantities.
Prices
Concerning energy prices actually paid by households, we use the corresponding commodityprice components for natural gas and electricity, which should not be mistaken for end-user tariffs, which include transmission and distribution costs as well as advalorem taxes. Natural gas prices were taken from ENARGAS data and include the two companies (Metrogas and Gas Ban) serving the AMBA region. Electricity prices are seasonal, monomial prices for residential demand taken from CAMMESA data and include the two companies serving the area (EDENOR and EDESUR).
As for long-run sustainable opportunity costs, i.e., prices that can sustain an expansion of supply so as to meet demand, we make different, but related, assumptions for natural gas and electricity. In the case of natural gas, we take border prices with Bolivia as reference wellhead prices that would sustain an expanding natural gas supply. These values were checked from different sources, such as the unitary import prices implicit in the Secretary of Energy (SE) data 18
and reference values from public and private Bolivian sources. In the case of electricity, we assume a generation cost of a combined-cycle plant that has variable costs related with the cost of natural gas from Bolivia and high fixed costs related with a high discount rate. households that faced no increases (about 60% of households) and to about 14% for households with the largest increases. In the case of electricity, the implicit subsidy moved from 30% of opportunity costs in 2003 to a mere 6% in 2014 for household with frozen tariffs (71% of total households) and to 23% for households with the largest increases.
Quantities
Aggregate annual quantities (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) Quantities used for the evaluation of incidence and welfare impact of household transfers were taken from the National Household Expenditure Survey for the AMBA. Following a method used in Navajas (2009), we were able to retrieve the quantities of natural gas and electricity consumed by each household in the survey. We are therefore able to implement the formulas of the previous section from observed quantities. We also use the distribution of consumptions across households, along with household data on income and total expenditure, which allows us to compute the social marginal-income utility of each household in order to implement the welfare weights (2003-2007 and 2008-2014) and the full-adjustment period is that while the former are actual estimates for a given period, the latter is a hypothetical estimation of an annual flow in the future. annual subsidy of about 400 USD. But the distribution of the subsidies, given the uniform prices until 2008, was not pro-poor-or pro-low-income households. Rather, it benefited the higher deciles of income distribution to a relatively greater degree (see Table 3 ). This is not surprising given the fact that subsidies were uniform and proportional to consumption until 2008. In the case of natural gas, the unfair distribution against low-income households is compounded by the fact that many of these do not receive any subsidy because they are not connected to the natural gas network (see Table A .4 in the Appendix) and use liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) at opportunity cost values. Hence, the nearly 4:1 ratio in 2003-2014 subsidies received by the 10 th compared to the 1 st decile can be explained by a 1.5:1 ratio in average consumption and by a 3:1 ratio in access to the network. Source: Tables 1 and 2 A return to opportunity cost is a reversion of subsidies that will imply transfers in opposite directions to those observed in 2003-2014. Annual transfers will depend on demand correction but will surely -and given higher projected natural gas prices that exert an impact on both estimates-be of a magnitude of about 2.7 billion USD per year (or >0.45% of current GDP), a large figure considering that we are measuring only households in the Buenos Aires
Metropolitan Region, which means about 25% percent of total consumption of natural gas and electricity. Unlike the transfers in 2003-2014, these will imply a permanent flow with a correspondingly large amount in relation to the "floor" at which prices were at the end of the subsidy era.
Welfare impacts
Tables 4 and 5 present the estimated annual percentage welfare changes (expression (13)) for the two different sub-periods and for different degrees of inequality aversion (v = .5, 1, and 2).
Again, we assume a 10% demand correction after prices return to opportunity cost pricing in 201X. The results show significant changes in welfare for households, but in particular for lowincome ones. The impact of household transfers on welfare is (as expected) a decrease in income. Recall that changes in welfare depend on the income level of each household, along with the degree of inequality aversion. Thus, the distribution of welfare gains has a higher impact on the poor, a fact that is only seemingly contradictory to the evidence that a large amount of subsidies go to the non-poor. The reason is that large subsidies for the wealthy are not as significant in terms of social welfare as those received by the poor. One important element of the results illustrated in Tables 4 and 5 is that (for the very same reason that percentage welfare impacts on the poor are large), the variability of the impacts is correspondingly large. To the extent that subsidies will be followed by price hikes, the wealthiest households will face variability in welfare of a relatively small magnitude, while the poorest will experience a great swing in utility and welfare. 
Conclusion
In this study we adopt the term "energy populism" to characterize a class of unsustainable pricing policies observed in some developing economies in the last decade (e.g. recent experiences in Argentina, Iran and Armenia). To our knowledge, we are the first to provide an analytical framework for explaining the emergence of the energy populism in terms of the preferences of a median household (i.e. voter) for receiving transfer gains followed by a stream of transfer losses. This description depends on a critical discount factor that in turn is contingent upon on a perception that the transfer losses will be somehow shifted away.
From theoretical grounds, a suggested line of future research is to polish the strategic behavior of the incumbent to implement (and of society to vote for) energy populism. In particular, exploring the inconsistencies involved in choosing the populist path given that consequences may end up being quite different from discourse or narrative, is an interesting topic. Another possible extension is the interplay between the adoption of energy populism and the policy-technology for dealing with transfers, particularly the lack of incentives to target energy subsidies to the poorest households accurately. Exit conditions from heavily subsidized prices poses a problem for society, given that at the new energy prices, a larger proportion of agents will encounter serious difficulties in coping with the energy price shocks.
Our empirical illustration is also original insofar as it characterizes transfers and welfare effects, clarifying the apparent puzzling or conflicting properties embedded in assertions about energy subsidies; i.e. they are usually termed "progressive" and "pro-rich" at the same time. This is so because the standard incidence test (where subsidies are progressive if they are decreasing in income, as a percentage of household income) is used to assert the former, while the measurement of the share of the non-poor in total subsidies is used to assert the latter. To complete the assessment we use an explicit measurement framework that allow us to deal with the welfare effects of the full subsidy cycle, dealing not only with levels but also with welfare instability induced by unsustainable subsidy policies. We show that the percentage instability of welfare experienced by households is decreasing in income, this effect being larger the higher the degree of inequality aversion, adding another dimension to the distributive characterization of energy subsidies policies. Welfare impacts for society as a percentage of total welfare are quite significant for both natural gas and electricity. As expected, percentage welfare gains for the poorest households are considerable larger compared with equivalent gains for the wealthy, due to the large differences in income.
We do not elaborate on the transition from subsidized prices to a new equilibrium. This move has partially begun, albeit slowly and with difficulties, due to the poor targeting associated with multi-part prices that implemented large price hikes for a small group of large consumers. We make a simple calculation of transfer losses on the assumption that the gap is closed and that every household pays opportunity costs. These are distributed in a similar fashion as transfer gains, given the assumed proportional (to consumption) adjustment for all households. However, the same is true with percentage welfare losses, that is, the poor receive the largest negative impacts. Thus, subsidy cycles have an additional property that is usually neglected in their distributional assessment, namely that they give rise to a larger welfare instability for the poor than for the non-poor.
From the previous results, it is clear that one drawback of following interventionist policies is the transmission of income and welfare instability to the society and, in particular, the poor.
What more can we say based on our measurement of AMBA household subsidies concerning the costs of energy populism? The answer depends on auxiliary assumptions, in particular on what can be said regarding the magnitude and duration of excess costs to be borne as a consequence of a decade of interventionism. While it is clear that the energy bill for the household sector in Argentina will increase substantially, the proper "excess cost" borne by households is the "premium" that Argentina managed before embarking on energy populism, such as enjoying a competitive up-stream natural gas sector that could sustain supply with prices below border prices. For example, assuming that this gap is only 20% of the computed jump from current prices to opportunity cost values, and a discount rate of 5%, the present value of the excess cost borne by households in the AMBA can be estimated at about 6 billion USD, or >1.3% of the current GDP. 
